Many countries have recently implemented fiscal decentralization reforms, assigning more functions and spending responsibilities to sub-national governments. In this paper we investigate the reasons behind the decentralization process of different categories of government expenditure (such as health, education, social security and welfare, housing, transports, public order) using IMF and OECD data for 21 developed countries over the period . We pay particular attention to the roles played by the taxing power of sub-national governments and by grants received from upper tiers of government. Then, we also study the determinants of the composition of local expenditure. Using a general-to-specific empirical approach, we adopt different models for each of the spending functions under analysis. This leads to a number of results, not yet reached in the existing literature, on the importance of tax decentralization, demographics, politics, and a number of other socio-economic variables.
Introduction
Recently, there has been a wave of new studies on decentralization and fiscal federalism following widespread reforms in both developed and developing countries (Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra 2010).
Major decentralization processes have occurred over a relatively short period of time in traditionally "unitary" European countries (such as France, Italy, and the United Kingdom), some of which now show decentralization levels that are comparable to those of federalist countries (Ter-Minassian 1997; Stegarescu 2005) . Although the literature offers a number of contributions on fiscal decentralization and its determinants (Wallis and Oates 1998; Panizza 1999; Letelier 2005; Beramendi 2007; Bodman and Hodge 2010) , it has largely overlooked the characteristics and the implications of the various expenditure categories such as those included in the Classification Of the Functions Of Government (COFOG) provided by the United Nations.
1 Fiva (2006, p. 260) states: "the effects of fiscal decentralization may differ according to the extent that the public spending enters as an input into the production function. It may also be reasonable to expect the effects to differ according to the redistributive effect of different kinds of government spending. Hence, separating public spending according to the United Nations (...) COFOG could be useful. Unfortunately, there is, as far as I know, no reliable longer time series available in the crosscountry setting for this classification." The existing empirical evidence on decentralization of these spending items is, accordingly, scarce, as most of the previous literature uses large spending conglomerates due to data availability issues (e.g., Persson and Tabellini 2003; Kappeler and Valila 2008; Rodríguez-Pose et al. 2009 ). The COFOG definition of aggregate public expenditure has only been studied in different contexts, such as those related to efficiency/government size (Shelton 2007; Ashworth et al. 2009 ), or to political economy considerations (Brender and Drazen 2009; Creedy and Moslehi 2009 ).
The aim of this paper is twofold: first, we offer evidence on the determinants of decentralization of seven different expenditure categories, based on some theoretical considerations. Then, we analyze the composition of the local budget according to the same classification. To these purposes, we construct a novel dataset on expenditure decentralization referred to the COFOG categories combining OECD National Accounts Statistics and IMF Government Finance Statistics (GFS) data 1 Public expenditure can be classified according to the following ten COFOG functions (policy domains): general public services; defence; public order and safety; housing and community amenities; economic affairs; environment protection; health; recreation, culture and religion; education; social protection. Each of them includes both current and capital expenditure. This makes the COFOG method different from the ECOG (Economic Classification of Government Expenditure) one, where total spending is divided into current and capital expenditure and then further into goods and services versus transfers. Hence, ECOG classifies expenditure by economic characteristics; COFOG by the function or purpose served. As we will explain later, in this paper we adopt the COFOG approach as provided by IMF. for 21 developed countries over the period . We pay particular attention to the role played by different local financing mechanisms (i.e., own taxes versus intergovernmental grants) in shaping expenditure decentralization by function. This has been rarely done before, although it is consistent with the prescriptions of Mc-Lure and Martinez-Vazquez (2000) according to whom a stable (and meaningful) decentralization process requires an unambiguous and well-defined institutional framework in the assignment of expenditure responsibilities among different government levels combined with a sufficient budgetary autonomy to carry out the assigned responsibilities at each level.
However, the fiscal federalism literature does not add much to these guidelines, as a substantial part of it typically assumes that lower levels of government both collect taxes and spend funds, so regional authorities can be classified either as low-tax-low services or high-tax-high-services (Bardhan 2002 ).
This assumption can be problematic for many countries characterized by fiscal imbalances, i.e. with either little or no relationship between fiscal autonomy and fiscal decentralization (OECD 2006) .
Using a general-to-specific empirical approach, we adopt different models for each of the spending functions under analysis and we provide a comprehensive analysis of the determinants of expenditure decentralization. We take advantage of the previous empirical studies by including in our model variables that have been found to significantly affect aggregate measures of fiscal decentralization (see Section 4 for details). We then use the same framework to analyze the determinants of the local budget composition, using the weights of each decentralized spending category over aggregate local expenditures.
We offer a number of new results on the roles played by tax decentralization, demographics, politics, and a number of additional socio-economic variables in shaping decentralization of the single expenditure functions. Tax decentralization and other financing tools appear to be extremely relevant in determining expenditure decentralization for the majority of the COFOG spending items considered. In detail, tax decentralization leads to lower social spending decentralization, whereas the opposite relationship holds for the rest of the functions (expectedly, there is no meaningful relationship with defence expenditure decentralization). On the other hand, tax decentralization and grants play a relatively minor role in affecting the composition of the local budget. We also find a non-negligible role of the political variables in affecting decentralization of all the spending categories examined, as well as the composition of sub-national expenditure. Openness, the level of economic development, government size, and educational attainment also affect either expenditure decentralization or the local spending composition.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some theoretical considerations on expenditure and tax decentralization and describes the main hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 illustrates the variables and the empirical strategy used in our analysis. Section 4 presents and discusses the estimation results. Finally, section 5 concludes.
The theoretical framework
Following Stegarescu (2009) , the aim of this section is not to so much contributing to the theoretical discussion, but formalizing some empirically testable hypotheses concerning the relationship between the degree of expenditure decentralization and the level of tax autonomy of local governments in a scenario where sub-national and central governments provide different public services to individuals.
We propose a theoretical sketch on the linkages between the so-called "tax assignment" issue at a local level (see Liberati 2011 for an extensive discussion) and the "expenditure task" problem (OECD 2009), due to the importance of benefit taxation in ensuring adequate coverage of the expenditures of sub-national governments.
We assume an economy with total population N and two different levels of government, the State and two regions ( ) as they have different competences and responsibilities by law. As in Stegarescu (2009) , L g may refer, e.g., to infrastructure or school education, given in equal amount to citizens belonging to the same region according to local preferences (
. The model of this paper assumes a situation wherein Tiebout-style stratification has already taken place and, since individuals are already sorted according to their preferences, there is no role for mobility (see also Alesina and Spolaore 1997; Panizza 1999) . In contrast, public services supplied by the central government, C g , are of uniform type and may include national public goods (e.g., defense and macroeconomic stabilization); C g is provided according to general preferences ( 1 0 < < β 
. Actually, we could allow preferences for central government services to differ across regions as in Stegarescu (2009) where there is a parameter measuring the preference distance between the type of central government services preferred by the region's inhabitants and the type actually provided. However, we choose to simply focus just on pure economic factors promoting (expenditure) decentralization, rather than relying on differences in preferences (see also Arzaghi and Henderson 2005) . In the same vein, we can affirm that results are the same even considering α α α = = j j for local public goods as in Stegarescu (2009). later, this can permit a better specification of the degree of fiscal decentralization, namely expenditure decentralization by function. More generally, we define the degree of fiscal decentralization as the local share in total governmental services provided by each region:
represents total (central plus local) public expenditure, as in Stegarescu (2009) Individuals pay a lump-sum tax t on income j y (normalized to 1) in order to finance central and local government provisions. Hence, the tax paid is identical for everyone and determined by the per capita costs of the public services as they are supplied in equal amounts in each region; 5 then, the contribution required to each citizen is:
Based upon these assumptions, the individual utility function is given by the following:
where γ represents the degree of tax decentralization, satisfying 1 0 < < γ
, where higher tax decentralization ( 1 → γ ) implies wider tax autonomy assigned to local governments which can rely more on own resources rather than on those of other levels of government. The idea is that citizens perceive positively the role of tax decentralization as it is a byword for sufficient budgetary autonomy to carry out the assigned responsibilities (see Mc-Lure and Martinez-Vazquez 2000) and can favor, to some extent, (more) political accountability and transparency in local government financing. 6 4 Other studies analyzing the determinants of fiscal centralization (e.g., Panizza 1999) and those focusing on the effects of fiscal decentralization on the economic distribution of public expenditures (Alegre 2010 ) adopt a similar approach to identify the level of centralization; it is usually assumed equal to the fraction of public expenditure provided by the central government. In all cases, the degree of centralization (or decentralization) is related to public provision of one government level. 5 We rely on a lump-sum tax in order to abstract from redistributive and distortionary effects of taxation. Indeed, we assume homogeneous income among individuals; then income distribution issues are beyond the scope of the paper as we focus on efficiency reasons driving fiscal (i.e., expenditure) decentralization. Actually, a more realistic scenario may imply the existence of proportional income taxes based on different income distribution across regions. For an extensive discussion on the cost and benefits of local versus central redistribution see Wildasin (1991 Wildasin ( , 1994 . 6 Versions of the same idea have already appeared in the theoretical literature (see Besley 2007 for a review) and applied to such different items as the observability of government reporting procedures (Milesi-Ferretti 2000) , government's choice between taxes or debt (Alt and Lassen 2003) , the trade-off between accountability and efficiency (Bordignon and Minelli 2001) , the political economic budget cycle (Rogoff and Sibert 1988) , local public good provision under shared accountability (Joanis, 2010) and so on.
The theoretical basis for this assumption is provided by the existing literature (see Weingast 2009 for an extensive review) suggesting that the best way to enforce local responsibility is to assign significant tax autonomy to local governments. On the contrary, central government grants would facilitate local governments' misconduct. Hence, own resources are likely to make local governments more accountable for their fiscal decision (Bahl and Linn 1992; McLure 1998; Shah 1998; MartinezVazquez and McNab 2003) and residents more informed and able to control how politicians spend public money. 7 All these aspects are captured in our model by the parameter γ , which has a positive effect on individual welfare through its "virtuous" impact on local services ( L g ), according to which more tax decentralization increases the benefit of local spending. Preferences for central government services ( β ) are also assumed to be influenced by the degree of local tax autonomy as individuals may evaluate/demand differently central spending ( C g ) given the various dimensions of tax decentralization. This gives rise to an indirect impact on the utility function through the marginal effect of γ on β (i.e., γ β ).
Substituting L g and C g both in t and in the utility function, we can re-write equation (2.1) to get:
Differentiating with respect to g and θ , we then obtain: ). On the other hand, the effect of tax decentralization on expenditure decentralization is not so clear a priori: To sum up, a higher tax decentralization does not necessarily lead to a higher expenditure decentralization as, even assuming its positive impact on individual welfare, a greater reliance on own taxes could enhance, e.g., rent-seeking behavior of political agents who can act, also locally, as budget-maximizing Leviathans (Brennan and Buchanan 1980) . Issues of this type may be at the roots of the fiscal mismatch between local revenue and expenditure that characterize many OECD countries (OECD 2006) .
On the other hand, fiscal (and thus expenditure) decentralization is more likely to be successful when sub-national governments are able to control their own sources of revenue (see also Mc-Lure and Martinez-Vazquez 2000) . This could justify the possible positive effect of tax decentralization on the analogous expenditure process in our model. These general implications are also valid when we refer to expenditure decentralization by function, i.e. when we consider the "narrower" definition of θ according to which central and subnational governments continue to provide public services within the same spending program.
The empirical strategy
Based on the theoretical considerations above, we now turn to the empirical analysis. First, we study the effects of tax decentralization, intergovernmental grants, and other socio-economic variables on public expenditure decentralization of seven COFOG categories. Second, we investigate the role of a similar set of explanatory variables on the composition of sub-national budget (decomposed into the seven spending categories above plus a residual one). The choice of sample under investigation is dictated by data availability, particularly because of the lack of fiscal decentralization data after 2006.
Actually, to our knowledge, there is no single dataset that classifies public expenditures of general and, especially, local governments according to the COFOG for a longer time period. 8 8 On the one hand, Sanz and Velázquez (2007) and Gemmell et al. (2008) study general government expenditures classified by COFOG in OECD countries but their analysis differs from our in several respects (for further details on these studies and their database see also Potrafke 2011 electoral rules theories), and also that on the role of demand and supply for specific expenditure categories (Shelton 2007 ).
We then look at the determinants of local budget composition by estimating the following model: (2007) considers both individual categories of expenditure (such as defence, education, healthcare and others) and different levels of government (central and local) using data from IMF-GFS from 1970 In macroeconomics, it is standard to use five-year periods. However, adopting this particular data frequency would greatly reduce the number of observations of our regression analysis, thus we present our benchmark results using three-year periods (they have been used before, e.g. by Borghi 2010) . In any case, we check the sensitivity of our results to the use of different data frequencies: annual, four-year, and five-year periods.
where exp_comp i [t-t+2] denotes eight different indexes gauging the importance of each spending item (i.e., the seven COFOG categories plus one, obtained as a residual component) over aggregate subnational expenditures (excluding intergovernmental grants). The dependent variable is once again expressed as three-year averages, and the right-hand-side variables as beginning-of-the-period values.
The explanatory variables are those of equation (3.1), except grants2 i,t that stands for the weight of transfers (from other government levels) received by sub-central units, normalized on the basis of aggregate local revenues 10 (i.e., its construction mimics that of the dependent variable).
Fixed-effects estimations are performed to control for country-specific time-invariant factors (e.g., institutional factors, such as whether the country is federal); period dummies are also included in both equations (τ t and ν t ), and u i,t and ε i,t are, respectively, the disturbance terms of the two models.
Equations (3.1) and (3.2) are estimated over three-year non-overlapping periods : 1972-1974, 1975-1977, ..., 2002-2004, and 2005-2006 (note that the last is a two-year period). There are three main reasons for adopting this procedure. First, we smooth out cyclical fluctuations. Second, our dependent variable contains a number of missing values -a problem that is reduced by computing period averages (Easterly 1999; Li and Reuveny 2003) . Third, we deal with potential reverse causality issues by expressing the dependent variables as period averages and the right-hand-side variables as beginning-of-the-period values.
It is worth spending a few words on the spending and revenue data, which mostly come from the IMF-GFS database. As for the former, we adopt the disaggregation of local expenditure into its main (Stegarescu 2005; Gemmell et al. 2008 ), on the expenditure side it is yet impossible to find more reliable data.
As for the revenue variables, we take into account tax decentralization and intergovernmental grants by distinguishing the way through which local governments finance their expenditures (i.e., common pool versus own resources) as different financing tools may have different restraining or expanding effects on alternative spending items as also suggested by Ashworth et al. (2009) . We use the "own revenue" tax decentralization index constructed by Gemmell et al. (2009) that captures a wide degree of local taxing power as it contains also locally collected taxes over which local 10 Aggregate local revenues are defined as the sum of local tax revenues and grants from other government levels. Local non-tax revenues and local capital revenues are excluded from this definition as they are recorded irregularly.
governments have little or no control. In detail, it includes shared taxes and other piggybacked revenues at a local level, not distinguishing them from more autonomous forms of taxation. However, the index is net of resources purely transferred from other governmental levels (i.e., grants); therefore, it only contains the revenues generated by sub-national governments and which are not discretionarily fixed by central government.
11
Finally, it is important to keep in mind that all these data do not allow any distinction among regional, local, and other lower tiers of governments: all sub-national units are aggregate into a single group; therefore, the number of participating sub-central governments and their different competencies are not properly taken into account. However, a further horizontal disaggregation would pose cross-country comparability issues that we want to avoid at this stage of the analysis.
The rest of the variables are included in the models for their potential role in shaping both the expenditure decentralization processes and the importance of each spending category in the local budgets. Some potentially meaningful variables such as the unemployment rate or regional ethnic and economic disparities are ruled out the analysis due to data availability. The general-to-specific approach implies that each specification of the models (3.1) and (3.2) will only include the explanatory variables with a t-statistic above a certain threshold (that we set equal to 1.00). Table 2 reports the estimates for the seven different specifications of equation (3.1).
Results and discussion

The determinants of expenditure decentralization
Insert Table 2 about here
Tax decentralization plays a significant role for most of the decentralized spending categories. In particular, it is positively correlated with healthcare, education, housing, and public order expenditure;
it is negatively associated with social protection expenditure decentralization. On the other hand, it does not explain decentralized transports and defence spending. As for the latter, it is worth saying that this function is very hard to decentralize (and actually the bulk of this kind of spending is done at the central government level in most of the countries of the sample) given its nature of purely "national" public good. Therefore, it is difficult to draw meaningful conclusions regarding it, i.e., the lack of clear evidence is not surprising. In turn, the negative coefficient associated with decentralization of social spending could have also been easily expected. It is common practice for central governments to finance this type of function even when it is assigned to regional and local governments (OECD 2006 (OECD , 2009 . The negative coefficient on td i,t , and the positive one on grants1 seem to well capture this phenomenon. This also reflects, to some extent, the normative prescriptions of the traditional theory of fiscal federalism on avoiding decentralized redistributive function.
The positive relationship between tax decentralization and decentralized spending on education is also interesting. Simple tax-benefit principles and the fact that limited spillover effects and little economies of scale characterize this type of expenditure at a local level (mostly consisting in school building and planning, professional training and students' services) support the link between decentralized revenues (also including tax-sharing mechanisms) and education spending. Our results suggest that adequate tax decentralization is likely to favour expenditure decentralization, increasing consistency between those that benefit from the programs and those who end up financing and paying for them. Similar conclusions apply to the following functions: health, housing and public order and safety. In the last case, the coefficient on tax decentralization shows the highest magnitude. To sum up, our results are in line with the previous theoretical considerations according to which tax decentralization can have an ambiguous effect on expenditure decentralization. The empirical evidence is able to better qualify this indeterminacy, distinguishing among different spending
functions.
An additional finding is that the effect of tax decentralization is stronger than that of intergovernmental transfers. Results suggest a positive relationship between grants and expenditure decentralization of housing and public order only (and social protection, but barely significant at conventional levels). The explanation may lie in the fact that even though these spending items can be easily classified as "local" functions, they can be mandated by the central government or spent on behalf of it, revealing the importance of intergovernmental transfers as their financing tool or as financial incentives. Indeed, the available data do not allow us to know whether grants are assigned, for example, in matching form indicating a specific initiative of the central government concerning certain services provision by sub-national governments.
The rest of the explanatory variables carry interesting information. Demographic variables (urb, popdens, pop14, po65, popgr) prove to be particularly important for the decentralization of all the different spending categories apart from public order. In particular, the proportion of population living in urban areas is always associated with negative coefficients (when included in the model), similarly to the proportion of people aged 14 years old or less. The results for the rest of the demographic variables vary across the seven specifications. The political dummies also play a part in shaping the expenditure decentralization processes, but again results vary widely. Having left dominance in the cabinet (party_5), though, is associated with lower expenditure decentralization in the majority of the specifications. Similarly wide ranges of results hold for the rest of the controls. Finally, higher real GDP per capita does not favour decentralized expenditure for welfare purposes (e.g., health and social security), while it better enhances housing spending decentralization (and defence but a lower level of significance). In turn, trade openness increases the level of decentralization of the transport sector and decreases that of housing and public order expenditure.
Robustness analysis
This section deals with the robustness of the results reported above. Tables 3-5 report the estimates of the different specifications of model (3.1) carried out with the data at four-year, five-year and annual frequencies, respectively. When annual data are used, the explanatory variables are lagged by one period to deal with reverse causality.
Insert Tables 3-5 about here
Although there are a few differences depending on the different time frequencies utilized, the benchmark results and the related conclusions are confirmed. A similar consistency is found when using simple period averages both for the dependent and the right-hand-side variables (not reported for the sake of brevity), instead of using beginning-of-the-period values for the latter to deal with reverse causality.
The determinants of local spending composition
In this section we further exploit our dataset to analyze what affects the local expenditure composition, when a country "chooses" to adopt the decentralization process for different spending programs. The theoretical literature on the issue only provides some normative prescriptions (Stigler 1957; Musgrave 1959; Oates 1972; Keen and Marchand 1997) by distinguishing among functions that sub-national governments should perform (e.g., allocation of resources) and those which are better accomplished at the central level (e.g., redistribution and stabilization). The empirical literature has overlooked the potential impact of decentralization on the composition of public expenditures (see Sanz and Velázquez 2002) .
The few existing studies only consider limited decompositions of the public budget, distinguishing between investment versus current expenditure (Alegre 2010) , or among different types of public investment (Faguet 2004; Kappeler and Valila 2008) , or between pork barrelling versus different expenditures (Diaz-Cayeros et al. 2002) . In general, a highly detailed decomposition of the public budget such as the one permitted by the COFOG definition has rarely been used in studies on the role played by fiscal decentralization in shaping the composition of spending, with the following few notable exceptions. Arze del Granado et al. (2005) test whether higher levels of fiscal decentralization increase the shares of consumption expenditures in the public budget (defined as the ratio of education and health expenditures to total public expenditures, which also represents the share of publicly provided public goods).
Similarly, Ashworth et al. (2009) We offer our evidence in Table 6 , reporting the estimates of the different specifications for equation (4.2), depending on the spending categories shares over the local budget used as dependent variables one at a time. In this case, we add a residual spending category (res_comp) obtained by subtracting the seven COFOG items from aggregate local expenditures.
Insert Table 6 about here
Tax decentralization proves to be an important determinant of decisions regarding which spending programs to implement at a sub-national level, although less than in the expenditure decentralization analysis. Results suggest that more tax autonomy leads sub-central governments to spend more on both healthcare and housing matters (see the positive coefficients) to the detriment of social protection and any other expense different from the seven COFOG categories (for which negative coefficients are estimated). The finding on social security expenditure is consistent with the result of section 4.1.
We can now extend the above conclusions affirming that, even controlling for the decentralization level of this function, sub-central governments do not devote many resources for these spending programs even when higher degrees of tax autonomy are granted. Rather, they prefer to "invest" in other sectors (e.g., health and housing).
The rest of the functions seem to be unaffected by tax decentralization (in the education specification, td i,t is included in the model but its coefficient is statistically insignificant; in the remaining specifications it is excluded from the model). This suggests that, in order to allocate resources from the local public budget towards different spending topics and thus choose the proper policy mix locally, the extension of the taxing power and revenue autonomy assigned to sub-national governments seems to play a negligible role. The same can be said for transfers from upper governmental levels, as the variable gauging the importance of grants in the sub-national revenues (grants2) does not influence the weight of any of the seven COFOG categories, but it is negatively associated with the residual expenditure.
To sum up, it seems that the composition of the local budget is quite independent from the revenue side, even considering both own sources and grants. This reveals, to some extent, a lack of correspondence between the available resources and the way they are spent as the driving reasons explaining the local budget composition lie elsewhere. In fact, the rest of the explanatory variables all seem to significantly affect at least one spending category (with the exception of party_5), with a wide variety of results depending on the specific function analyzed. Alternative estimates with different time frequencies (available upon request) confirm the robustness of the results.
Summary and conclusions
In this paper we offer evidence on the determinants of expenditure decentralization analyzing seven different COFOG functions for 21 developed countries over the period 1972-2006, given the ongoing fiscal federalism processes experienced by most of them. To this purpose, we combine OECD and IMF data to construct a new and rich dataset. In contrast with much of the previous literature, we concentrate on the role played by the revenue side, i.e. taxes and grants, in shaping expenditure decentralization by function. We advance some theoretical considerations to support this investigation. In the second part of the empirical analysis, we focus on the local budget only, analyzing the determinants of the expenditure composition.
The analysis leads to a number of novel and interesting results. On theoretical grounds, higher tax decentralization (i.e., more tax autonomy) -perceived to be positive on the individual welfare -can lead either to increase spending decentralization (confirming a suitable convergence between expenditure and revenue decentralization) or to lower spending decentralization (confirming the presence of fiscal imbalances at the local level also in many OECD countries).
On the empirical side, tax decentralization and other local financing tools appear to be extremely relevant in shaping expenditure decentralization for the majority of the COFOG items considered. In particular, tax decentralization leads to lower social expenditure decentralization, but to higher decentralization of the rest of the spending programs. No meaningful relationship emerges with decentralized defence expenditure as one could expect. In turn, tax decentralization and intergovernmental grants do not seem to play a substantial role in affecting the local budget composition. Instead, we find a non-negligible impact of the political variables in explaining decentralization of all the spending categories under analysis, as well as the expenditure policy mix at a sub-national level. Similar evidence arises for the variables capturing trade openness, the level of economic development, government size, and educational attainment.
To sum up, it seems that the decentralization degrees of different spending functions in OECD countries have been enhanced by a common tendency to finance a large fraction of such expenditures (with some exceptions) using sub-national tax revenues in preference to intergovernmental transfersi.e. with 'own versus others' money'. At the same time, given a certain degree of expenditure decentralization, local governments of developed countries do not rely so much on their tax autonomy -neither on grants -as the key factor to determine (and then decide) the allocation of sub-central resources across different spending categories. The driving force seems to lie elsewhere.
Some of our results seem to better qualify some of the existing theoretical prescriptions. For example, those of the fiscal federalism mainstream on limiting decentralized redistribution are basically supported by our findings on the relationships between tax decentralization/grants and social protection spending. On the other hand, some of the evidence offered in this paper suggests that other general concepts should be reconsidered. For instance, a substantial part of the literature on fiscal decentralization typically assumes that lower levels of government both collect taxes and spend funds, so regional authorities can be classified either as low-tax-low services or high-tax-high-services. This sentence turns out to be yet problematic according to our "mixed" effects of tax decentralization on the decentralization process of the various spending categories. This evidence claims for a better understanding of the decentralization reforms in countries characterized by little or no linkages between fiscal autonomy and fiscal decentralization. ; N = 21 countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, USA) . 63 Note: t-statistics in parenthesis based on robust standard errors. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Country dummies and time fixed effects included but not reported. Five-year nonoverlapping periods are used: the dependent variables are expressed as period averages; the explanatory variables are expressed as beginning-of-the-period values to deal with reverse causality. 54 Note: t-statistics in parenthesis based on robust standard errors. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Country dummies and time fixed effects included but not reported. Annual data are used: explanatory variables lagged by one period are used to deal with reverse causality. t-statistics in parenthesis based on robust standard errors. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Country dummies and time fixed effects included but not reported. Three-year nonoverlapping periods are used: the dependent variables are expressed as period averages; the explanatory variables are expressed as beginning-of-the-period values to deal with reverse causality.
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